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CeDEx workshop - Nikos Nikoforakis (Melbourne)

Date(s)
Friday 15th April 2011 (13:00-14:00)
Description

Normative conflict and feuds: The limits of self-enforcement

Abstract: A normative conflict arises when there exist multiple plausible norms of behavior. In such cases, norm enforcement can lead to a sequence of mutual retaliatory sanctions, which we refer to as a feud. We investigate the hypothesis that normative conflict enhances the likelihood of a feud in a public-good experiment. We find that punishment is much more likely to trigger counter-punishment and start a feud when there is a normative conflict, than in a setting in which no conflict exists. While the possibility of a feud sustains cooperation, the cost of feuding fully offsets the efficiency gains from increased cooperation.

paper

Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics

Sir Clive Granger Building
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University Park
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telephone: +44 (0)115 951 5458
Enquiries: jose.guinotsaporta@nottingham.ac.uk
Experiments: cedex@nottingham.ac.uk